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Abstract
This paper considers the rigorous design of Systems of Systems (SoS), i.e. systems composed of a series
of heterogeneous components whose number evolves with time. Such components coalize to accomplish
functions that they could not achieve alone. Examples of SoS includes (among many others) smart cities
or airport management system. Dynamical evolution of SoS makes it impossible to design an appropriate
solution beforehand. Consequently, existing approaches build on an iterative process that takes its evolution
into account. A key challenge in this process is the ability to reason and analyze a given view of the SoS, i.e.
verifying a series of goals on a fixed number of SoS constituents, and use the results to eventually predict its
evolution. To address this challenge, we rely on a scalable formal verification technique known as Statistical
Model Checking (SMC). SMC quantifies how close the current view is from achieving a given mission. We
integrate SMC with existing industrial practice, by addressing both methodological and technological issues.
Our contribution is: (1) a methodology for validation of SoS formal requirements; (2) a formal specification
language able to express complex SoS requirements; (3) adoption of current industry standards for simulation
and heterogeneous systems integration ; (4) a robust SMC tool-chain integrated with system design tools used
in practice. We illustrate the application of our SMC tool-chain and the obtained results on a case study.
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1. Introduction
Context and challenges A System of Systems (SoS)
is a large-scale, geographically distributed set of
independently managed, heterogeneous Constituent
Systems (CS). Those entities are collaborating as a
whole to accomplish functions/goals that could not
HResearch supported by the European Community’s Seventh
Framework Programme [FP7] under grant agreement no 287716
(DANSE).
be achieved otherwise by any of them, if considered
alone [1]. Those goals can either be global to the system,
or local to some of its constituents. Constituent Systems
are loosely coupled and pursue their own objectives,
while collaborating for achieving SoS-level objectives.
An SoS adapts itself to its environment through (1) an
evolution of the functions provided by its Constituent
Systems and (2) an evolution of its architecture. A
typical example of an SoS is the Air Traffic Management
System of an airport, which coordinates incoming and
outgoing aircraft as well as ground-based vehicles
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and controllers. Such an SoS may evolve in order to
accommodate a larger number of passengers, difficult
climatic conditions or a modification in the laws
regarding security.
Misbehaviors of the functions provided by an SoS
can be dangerous and costly. Therefore, it is important
to identify a set of analyses and tools to verify
that the SoS implementation meets functional and
non functional requirements and correctly adapts to
changes of the environment during any phase of the
design and operation life-cycle. The manager of a
SoS should be able to run these analyses in order to
take decisions regarding the evolution of the SoS. The
main characteristics of an SoS have been long debated
since [1]. Nevertheless, one of the key characteristics
of an SoS is dynamical evolution, that is, the fact that
Constituent Systems may evolve, leave, fail, or be
replaced.
In fact, dynamical evolution of SoS makes it impossi-
ble to design an appropriate solution beforehand. Con-
sequently, the design flow of a SoS is reiterated multiple
times during the operation of the SoS, in order to adapt
to its evolutions. As a summary, SoS rigorous design
methodologies thus introduce two major challenges.
The first one is to check whether a given view of the
system (i.e. a fixed number of components) is able to
achieve a mission. The second challenge is to exploit
the solution to the first challenge in an engineering
methodology that permits dynamical evolution of the
system in case new missions are proposed, in case the
environment has changed, or in case the current view
cannot achieve the mission. This design approach has
been followed by the DANSE project which developed a
new SoS design and operation methodology [2].
Contributions This paper focuses on Challenge one
described above, that is to reason on a given view of
the system. A corner stone to solve the challenge is
to develop a usable language for expressing formal
requirements independent from the number and
identity of CSs and thus from the architectural choices.
In this paper, we propose Goal Contract Requirement
Language (GCSL). This is a very expressive pattern-
based language to specify requirements on an SoS
and its CSs. The language uses an extension of
OCL to express constraints independent of the view
such as: “the total fire area (over a set of districts)
is smaller than 1 percent of the total area of
the districts”. By combining those constraints with
temporal patterns, we express timing requirements
on the behaviors of the view. For instance, the
GCSL formula “always [SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea→sum()<
0.01∗SoS.itsDistricts.area→sum()]” checks that the above
constraint is verified at any point of the simulation.
A first version of GCSL was introduced in [3]. In this
paper we propose additional patterns for expressing
properties about the amount of time during which
a given predicate remains satisfied. We show that
GCSL is powerful enough to capture most of SoS
goals and emergent behaviors proposed by our industry
partners. The reader shall observe that the language
can methodologically be extended to capture more
requirements on demand.
The second main difficulty is to detect emergent
behaviors and verify the absence of undesired ones.
This requires a suitable verification technique. A first
solution would be to use formal techniques such as
model checking. Unfortunately, both the complexity
and the heterogeneous nature of the constituent
systems prevent this solution. To solve this problem,
we rely on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [4].
SMC works by monitoring executions of the system,
and then use an algorithm from the statistics in
order to assess the overall correctness. Contrarily to
classical Validation techniques, SMC quantifies how
close the view is from achieving a given mission.
This information shall later be exploited in the
reconfiguration process.
The objective of this paper is not to improve
existing statistical algorithms, but to expand the SMC
verifier PLASMA [5] which proposes several algorithms
such as Monte Carlo or hypothesis testing. In order
to implement an SMC algorithm for SoS, one has
to propose a simulation approach for heterogeneous
components as well as a monitoring approach for GCSL
requirements. While a GCSL monitor is easily obtained
by translating GCSL to Bounded Temporal Logic (BLTL)
as in [6], simulating SoS requires that one defines a
formal representation for SoS constituents. In this work,
we exploit the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI) [7]
standard as a unified representation for heterogeneous
systems. In recent years, the development of DESYRE,
a simulation engine based on the System-C standard,
provided us joint simulation for FMI/FMU. One of the
main contributions of the paper is a full integrated
tool-chain between IBM Rhapsody, the statistical model
checker PLASMA [5] and DESYRE. This tool-chain is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first one offering a full
SMC-based approach for the verification of complex
heterogeneous systems.
The third main difficulty of our work is to make sure
that the technology will be accepted by practitioners,
both in terms of usability and seamless integration
with existing industrial practice and tools. Our
first contribution provides a solution for expressing
requirements. However, we need a language to specify
the system itself. In this paper, we propose to
support wide-spread industry standards for SoS. This
is done by exploiting UPDM [8] for SoS architecture
design and the FMI standard for constituent systems
integration. We build on IBM Rhapsody which is a
tool used to describe UPDM views, that we enrich
2
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with probability distributions. The latter captures
uncertainty on the environment so that the verification
accounts for predictions on environment’s evolution.
We then integrate the Constituent Systems behavioral
models with the UPDM architecture through the FMI
standard. By exploiting our SMC tool-chain, we thus
provide full integration of our SMC-based tool for
FMI/FMU within Rhapsody.
Our approach is illustrated on a fire emergency
response SoS, at the scale of a city. The constituent
systems are the districts of the city, firefighting cars,
firemen, fire stations and the central command center.
We show how our tools are used to model the
architecture and the constituents systems of the SoS.
The architecture indicates how the Constituent Systems
cooperate to provide an emergent behavior, namely the
extinction of the fires. Using our tool-chain, we evaluate
the probability of this emergent behavior.
Structure of the paper The paper is organized as
follows. In Section 4 we provide a summary of the
Statistical Model Checking approach adopted in our
tool-chain. Following this, in Section 5 we introduce
the GCSL formal language for specifying formal
requirements on SoS and CSs behavior. Finally, we
discuss in Section 6 the SMC tool-chain and its
integration with existing industrial tools for System
design. This tool-chain is demonstrated on an industrial
case study in Section 7, where we show its application
to a Fire Emergency Response system designed in
DANSE [9], modeling a complex SoS that manages fire
emergencies in a large city.
2. SoS Modelling
A SoS model consists of a model of the SoS architecture
and a set of models formalizing each Constituent
System’s behavior. We chose the UPDM language to
describe both the SoS architecture and Constituent
System’s behavior, even though the latter can be
described through other modelling languages, as
explained in the following.
UPDM, or Unified Profile for DoDAF1 and
MoDAF2 [8], is a modeling language standardized
by the Object Management Group (OMG) in 2012.
UPDM 2.0 defines a UML 2 and optional SysML
profile to model architectures, support analysis,
specification, design and verification for a broad range
of complex systems, including SoS architectures and
service oriented architectures. Through the profile
extension mechanism inherited from UML, UPDM
allows adding, extending and customizing standard
1Department of Defense Architecture Framework
2Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework
profiles by creating libraries of new components and
stereotypes to further refine domain-specific concepts.
A stereotype defines how an existing UML, SysML or
UPDM metaclass can be extended. It can be applied to
a configurable set of model elements i.e. for replacing
existing features or for enabling new ones. A stereotype
can have properties, referred to as tags definitions [10].
When a stereotype is applied to a model element, the
value of the tags can be set for that model element. The
remaining of this Section describes how we extended
UPDM to accomplish architectural and behavioural
representations supporting statistical model checking
analysis.
2.1. Modelling Constituent Systems’ Behaviour
To perform SMC, the designer needs to specify
a stochastic behaviour for the constituent system.
Typical examples when stochastic behaviours are
relevant in a model include formalizing variability
of external inputs and waiting time before events’
occurrence, unpredictability of components’ failure,
and so on. To this end, the designer can use functions
provided by the tool used for modelling. However,
when using UPDM the designer can rely on a
DANSE extension to the UPDM profile developed
specifically for statistical model checking. We have
defined the «Stochastic» profile with a set of ad-
hoc stereotypes to support stochastic variables in
SV-10b viewpoint (state-charts), the UPDM view we
use to model CS behaviours. Our stochastic profile
defines Uniform, Normal and CustomDistribution
distributions stereotypes on the Integer and Real
domains; custom distribution variables are based on
user-defined probability distribution functions (further
details can be found in [3]); each of the two “Uniform”
stereotypes (for Integer and Real values respectively)
has two tags to specify the min and max bounds of
the range interval, whereas each of the two Normal
stereotypes has two tags to specify the desired mean and
standard deviation parameters. UPDM is not the only
language we support to model Constituent Systems’
behaviour. The choice on what modelling language
best fits the CS behaviour specification depends on
the physical phenomenon that the CS has to do with.
In our approach we leave total freedom to the CS
designer to use any modelling language, provided that
the modelling tool implementing that language is able
to export the CS model according to the FMI 1.0
standard [7], which is discussed later in this paper.
2.2. Modeling the architecture
The architecture of the SoS specifies how instances
of constituent systems are interconnected. A SoS does
not have a fixed number of CS instances over its
execution because CSs are independently managed and
3
EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
A. Arnold, M. Baleani, A. Ferrari, M. Marazza, V. Senni, A. Legay, J. Quilbeuf and C. Etzien
may decide to leave or join a given SoS on their own.
Therefore, rather than defining exactly how many CS
are present in the SoS, we first specify an abstract
architecture that defines the kind of CSs that can join
the system and how they can interconnect with other
CSs. For simulation, we fix a concrete architecture that
is a possible instance of the abstract architecture. Our
need for describing the architecture is satisfied by the
UPDM 2.0 System Viewpoint 1 (SV-1).
The SoS Abstract Architecture. The abstract architecture
is specified using the SV-1 Block Definition Diagram
(BDD), a representation of the SoS hierarchy defining:
1. the System of Systems and its parameters,
2. the type of each Constituent System,
3. the interface in terms of ports and their type of
each Constituent System,
4. the CS parameters, along with their types and
default value, and
5. the composition relations between the SoS and its
CSs.
Creating the UPDM SoS abstract architecture model
requires for each CS, including those not specified
UPDM (see Section 2.1), a corresponding UPDM
representation as «System» blocks so that they can be
later instantiated as parts of the overall SoS in the
SoS concrete architecture. In particular, for those CSs
not specified UPDM the interface, the parameters and
the observable state variables specified in the UPDM
«System» block must be exactly the same as the ones
specified in the CS modelling tool. This correspondence
is fundamental to guarantee that the simulator can
match the UPDM representation of each CS with
its associated executable file, thus allowing correct
simulation.
The SoS Concrete Architecture. In order to define the
concrete architecture, we rely on the SV-1 Internal
Block Diagram (IBD), an integration view of the SoS
defining:
1. a set of instances of CS types specified in the SoS
abstract architecture,
2. the role of each CS instance in the SoS, including
instance-specific parameter assignments, and
3. the connections between ports of CS instances,
according to the abstract architecture.
The instance of a «System» block specified in the
SoS abstract architecture (UPDM SV-1 BDD) is a
«ResourceRole» block in the SoS concrete architecture
(UPDM SV-1 IBD). The Value tag of UPDM Attributes in
both diagrams can be defined to set (BDD) or override
(IBD) the initialization value of the corresponding
variable in the CS executable file. To assure that the
simulator will use the initialization values specified in
either architectural view the user must ensure that the
name of the attribute matches the name of the associated
variable in the CS model.
Besides the «Stochastic» profile described in Section
2.1, we defined two other profiles to provide informa-
tion for joint simulation and to express requirements.
With these three profiles we can specify all the infor-
mation needed to accomplish statistical model checking
analysis over the specific SoS architecture and CSs
behavioural models.
Providing Information for Joint Simulation. To provide
information for joint simulation our «Simulation» pro-
file defines the following stereotypes: «FMI», «Trace-
able» and «FMIIgnore». To support SMC analysis the
simulation engine needs to know –besides other impor-
tant information– the name and the location on the file-
system or on a remote server of each CS’s executable
file (Functional Mockup Unit) expressing its behaviour.
Such information is provided by the FileName and
URI tags of the «FMI» stereotype. The «FMI» stereo-
type has been made applicable to both UPDM «Sys-
tem» blocks and «ResourceRole» blocks. When applied
to a «ResourceRole» block the information stored in the
«FMI» stereotype attributes overrides the one contained
in the corresponding «System» block.
SMC analysis requires observation of all (and only)
those SoS model variables constrained by GCSL
contracts. To allow the simulation tool (see Section 3)
properly generating variable observers to track values
only for the needed variables we have defined the
«Traceable» stereotype and made it applicable to any
attribute of «ResourceRole» elements representing a CS
and «System» element representing the SoS.
Sometimes, the SoS UPDM model contains informa-
tion not needed for SMC analysis. Filtering out such
extra information to leave only the one essential to
the SMC analysis stage is enabled by our «FMIIg-
nore» stereotype, applicable to model elements’ ports
and attributes. When this stereotype is applied to make
a port “invisible” to the host simulator (DESYRE) also
the interconnection between the two end ports needs to
become “invisible”. Consistently, the corresponding CS
behavioural model will neither have to have such ports,
nor its behavior will have to generate any data flowing
through those ports.
Expressing Requirements. To pursue our SMC analysis
goals on SoS we have defined a number of stereotypes
collected by the «GoalsAndContracts» profile. One of
the stereotypes of the «GoalsAndContracts» profile
associates GCSL contracts to elements of the abstract
architecture, possibly including the root element. To
express contracts on model elements throughout our
4
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SoS UPDM SV-1 diagrams we rely on the UPDM
“Constraint” model element inherited from UML [8].
To link a contract to CS or SoS «System» elements
in a UPDM BDD, or to specific CS instances,
stereotyped as «ResourceRole» in a UPDM IBD, we
use the “constrainedElement” association provided by
the “Constraint” model element. We have further
extended the features of “Constraint” by defining the
«gcsl» stereotype. The «gcsl» stereotype defines tags to
specify (1) the GCSL assumption in textual form, (2)
the GCSL guarantee in textual form, (3) the probability
threshold with which the GCSL requirement has to be
satisfied, and (4) the GCSL requirement identifier as an
alphanumeric string.
3. Performing Joint Simulation in DESYRE
3.1. Integrating Heterogeneous CSs’ Behaviours
Constituent Systems are systems that evolve according
to their own nature and mission, independently from
the SoS. The nature of the CS implies that its behaviour
be modelled using the most appropriate modelling tool
for the specific application, which typically leads to
a set of proprietary format of model representation
and interfaces. Formalizing different Constituent Sys-
tems’ behavior requires supporting a variety of models
of computation, including continuous-time dynamics,
discrete-time dynamics with variable or fixed integra-
tion step intervals and event-based dynamics. In many
cases the size of such integration time-step spans from
milliseconds to years within the same SoS model. For
this reasons we refer to a SoS model as being a com-
position of heterogeneous Constituent Systems’ mod-
els. To guarantee correct integration and simulation of
heterogeneous CSs models to support statistical model
checking we need to translate all these differences to a
common format. Our approach requires CS behavioural
models to comply with the Functional Mock-up Inter-
face (FMI) [7].
A number of approaches are possible for integrating
Heterogeneous CSs’ Behaviours. Co-simulation relies
on distinct simulation tools to provide a global
simulation of the overall system. The integration
can be performed using simulators’ API, a common
proprietary interface, such as the Simulink S-function,
or a standard interface, for instance FMI for co-
simulation. The approach proposed in this paper
is based on “joint-simulation”: a single simulator
integrates the models of system components (i.e. CS
models in the context of this work), each consisting of
differential, algebraic and discrete equations describing
components’ continuous and discrete dynamics. To
maximize tool interoperability the choice for a common
interface to components’ equations has fallen on the
one defined by the Functional Mock-up Interface (FMI)
standard [7].
FMI is a tool-independent standard whose develop-
ment was initiated within the ITEA2 project MOD-
ELISAR with the objective of easing the exchange of
simulation models between different entities despite
the usage of a variety of different tools. FMI stan-
dard was developed as a collaborative effort involving
simulation tool vendors and research institutes. FMI
standard maintenance and development (FMI 2.0 has
been published in July 2014) is today performed by the
Modelica Associations and it is currently supported by
tens of academic and industrial tools.
FMI defines the interface of an executable, called
Functional Mock-up Unit (FMU) and supports both
model exchange and co-simulation of dynamic models.
An FMU can either be self-integrating (i.e. can include
its own numerical solver), or require an external
simulator to perform its numerical integration. The
former is the case of “FMI for co-simulation”, the
latter is called “FMI for model exchange”. FMUs used
for joint-simulation have to comply to the “FMI for
model exchange” interface, version 1.0. This version of
the interface allows handling “hybrid ODEs” [11] i.e.
ordinary differential equations in state space form with
events. Systems described by hybrid ODEs combine
a piecewise continuous state (discontinuities occur at
event instants) with a time-discrete state that changes
only in correspondence of event instants.
Several modeling and simulation tools like Modelica,
JModelica, Dymola, Rhapsody and Simulink/StateFlow
support exporting models to FMI 1.0. Such tools can be
seamlessly integrated with this core tool-chain thanks
to our choice to adopt that standard. Joint simulation
capabilities are provided by DESYRE [3], a simulation
framework based on the SystemC standard and its
discrete-event simulation kernel. Inputs to DESYRE
are the SoS architecture exported from Rhapsody and
the Functional Mock-up Units (FMUs) associated to
CS types. Joint simulation of several FMUs, that are
units complying with the FMI standard, is imple-
mented by a Master Algorithm (MA), with two alterna-
tives. In co-simulation, each FMU embeds its own ODE
solver and computes autonomously the evolution of its
continuous-time variables. In model exchange, the MA
is in charge of computing evolution of continuous-time
variable. In general the implementation of a Master
Algorithm (MA) is not a trivial task having to guar-
antee: (1) correctness of the composition according to
the model(s) of computation (MoC) of both the host
environment and the constituent FMUs, (2) termination
of the integration step and (3) determinism of the
composition. Challenges related to the implementation
of Master Algorithms for model composition, have been
extensively addressed in the literature. In [12] the
authors define the operational and denotational seman-
tics of the (hierarchical) composition of Synchronous
Reactive (SR), Discrete Event (DE), and Continuous
5
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Algorithm 1 DESYRE FMI MA for DANSE.
Input: simStartT ime, simEndT ime,maxIntStep;
1: simT ime = simStartT ime;
2: isCT = determineIf CT ();
3: for all cs ∈ csList do
4: csEvt = cs.initialize(simT ime);
5: if (csEvt , ∅); then
6: evtQueue.addEvt(cs.getID(), csEvt);
7: end if
8: if (((evtQueue.getClosestEvtTime()−simT ime) > maxIntStep) and isCT )
then
9: evtQueue.addEvt(cs.getID(), maxIntStep);
10: end if
11: end for
12: while (simT ime ≤ simEndT ime and not(simStopEvt)) do
13: simT ime = getSimT ime();
14: while (not(isSoSFixP tReached())) do
15: for all cs ∈ csList do
16: cs.updateDiscrState(simT ime);
17: end for
18: end while
19: for all cs ∈ csList do
20: cs.updateContState(simT ime);
21: end for
22: evtQueue.updateEvts();
23: simT ime = evtQueue.getClosestEvtTime();
24: waitNextActivationEvt();
25: end while
Time (CT) models. Termination and determinacy prop-
erties of MA for co-simulation are addressed in [13].
3.2. DESYRE Master Algorithm
Within the context of the DANSE project a specific
FMI Master Algorithm has been developed in DE-
SYRE to address the unique needs of Systems of
Systems simulation and SMC. The main focus is on
simulation efficiency due to SoS model complexity and
large observation (i.e. simulation) time span (up to
several years) and to support large number of runs
(tens or hundreds of thousands) as required by SMC
analysis. The MA builds on a set of assumptions that
are typically satisfied by the CS models used within
the DANSE context. The choice of a MA for model
exchange rather than co-simulation provides us with
full control of the overall integration algorithm. The
MA assumes that none of the FMUs contains direct
feed-through i.e. FMU output does not depend on the
value of its inputs at the current simulation time,
removing the need for a causality analysis during the
fixed point computation at each step. The solver used
for the continuous state of continuous-time FMUs is
the simple forward Euler algorithm rather than higher
order Runge-Kutta (RK) methods. While this method
can be numerically unstable and its global error is
linear with the integration step, it does not require the
computation of state (and inputs) at intermediate steps,
which makes the integration method compositional and
does not require any “roll-back” mechanism due to
the validity of the selected step size. In the current
implementation the step sizemaxIntStep is specified by
the user for the entire model but can be easily extended
to support a different step size for each FMU. Besides
affecting the rounding error and the stability of the
algorithm the step size determines also the capability
of detecting state events (i.e. zero-crossing) occurring
during an integration step as well as their location on
the time axis. In fact, state events are checked for only
at the end of each integration cycle and, if detected,
are given a time stamp equal to current simulation
time with an error that in the worst case equals the
discretization step maxIntStep. All these limitations
were proven acceptable in all the use cases exercised
within the DANSE project.
Lines 1 to 11 in Algorithm 1 represent the
initialization phase, while lines 12 to 25 describe the
SoS system simulation loop. The algorithm determines
the time synchronization instants for the different
FMUs composing the SoS model. Time synchronization
points represent those time instants in which (1)
the different FMUs are executed, (2) the generated
outputs are propagated among their interfaces (line
16) and (3) FMU continuous state is updated (line 20).
Synchronization points are calculated based on time
events, state events and step events notified by the
different FMUs [7].
3.3. Joint-Simulation Traces
The execution of a SoS model results in a trace, that
is also exploited by our SMC analysis. The formal
definition of trace is provided by Definition 1.
Definition 1. Given a set of variables V and their domain
D, a state σ is a valuation of the variables, that is σ ∈
DV . A trace τ is a sequence of states and timestamps
(σ0, t0), · · · , (σk , tk), where ∀i ti ∈ R+ ∧ ti < ti+1.
In our setting, a trace contains an element for each
time step of the simulation. At each step, the value of all
observed variables are recorded. The observed variables
V are the exported variable to which the «traceable»
stereotype has been applied.
4. Background on Statistical Model Checking
Analyzing Systems of Systems requires a careful choice
of the verification technique to use. A first solution
would be to use model checking. However, this formal
approach often requires an input written in a dedicated
language, which conflicts with industry acceptance.
Even if a complete model were made in a suitable
language, analysis would not be feasible because of the
very large size of SoSs and its heterogeneous nature.
Therefore, we rely on Statistical Model Checking (SMC),
which is a trade off between testing and model
checking. SMC works by simulating the system and
verifying properties on the simulations. An algorithm
from the statistic area exploits those results to estimate
the probability for the system to satisfy a given
requirement.
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The quantitative results provided by SMC is richer
than a Boolean one. Indeed, if the system does not
satisfy the requirement, a Boolean tool returns “not
satisfied” without any evaluation of the probability of
a correct behavior.
In order to apply SMC, one has to assume that the
behavior of the system is governed by a stochastic
semantic, that is the choice of the next state in an
execution depends on a probability distribution. This
hypothesis shall not be seen as a drawback. Indeed,
most of SoS do make stochastic assumptions on their
external environment or on their hardware. In case
no distribution is known, one relies on the uniform
distribution which has the maximal entropy.
In the rest of this section, we first present the BLTL
logic used to express properties on system’s executions.
Then, we present some statistical algorithms used by
the SMC engine.
4.1. BLTL Linear Temporal Logic
In this paper, we focus on requirements of SoS that
can be verified on bounded executions. This assumption
is used to guarantee that the SMC algorithm will
terminate. The bounded hypothesis shall not be viewed
as a problem. Indeed, like it is the case in the testing
world, it is sufficient to consider that the system has a
finite live time.
We present here BLTL, a variant of LTL [14] where
each temporal operator is bounded. Properties of SoS
will be expressed in GCSL, that instantiates to BLTL
(see Section 5). The core of BLTL is defined by the
following grammar, where the time subscript t is
interpreted as an offset from the time instant where the
sub-formula is evaluated:
ϕ ::= true | false | p∈AP | ϕ1 ∧
ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 U≤t ϕ2 | X≤tϕ
Here, AP is a set of atomic predicates defined in
Section 5.2. In our case, an atomic predicate depends
on the past states. The temporal modalities F (the
“eventually”) and G (the “always”) can be derived from
the “until” U as Ftϕ = true U≤t ϕ and Gtϕ = ¬Ft¬ϕ,
respectively. The semantics of BLTL is defined with
respect to finite traces τ . We denote by τ, i |= ϕ the fact
that a trace τ = (σ0, t0), · · · , (σ` , t`) satisfies the BLTL
formula ϕ at point i of execution. The meaning of
τ, i |= ϕ is defined recursively:
τ, i |= true and τ, i 6|= false;
τ, i |= p if and only if p(τ, i) (cf. Subsection 5.2);
τ, i |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if and only if τ, i |= ϕ1 and τ, i |= ϕ2;
τ, i |= ¬ ϕ if and only if τ, i 6|= ϕ;
τ, i |= ϕ1Utϕ2 if and only if there exists an integer j ≥ i such
that (i) tj ≤ ti + t, (ii) τ, j |= ϕ2, and (iii) τ, k |= ϕ1, for each
i ≤ k < j;
τ, i |= X≤tϕ if and only if τk , 0 |= ϕ where k = min{j > i | tj >
ti + t} and τk = ((s′0, t
′
0), · · · , (s
′
`−k , t
′
`−k)) with s
′
i = si+k and
t′i = ti+k ;
Typically, a monitor, such as in [15], is used to decide
whether a given trace satisfies a given property.
4.2. Statistical Model Checking
Given a stochastic system M and a property ϕ, SMC
is a simulation-based analysis technique [4, 16] that
answers two questions: (1) Qualitative : whether the
probability p for M to satisfy ϕ is greater or equal to
a certain threshold ϑ or not; (2) Quantitative : what
is the probability p for M to satisfy ϕ. In both cases,
producing a trace τ and checking whether it satisfies
ϕ is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable Bi of
parameter p. Such a variable is 0 (τ 6|= ϕ) or 1 (τ |= ϕ),
with P r[Bi = 1] = p and P r[Bi = 0] = 1 − p. We want to
evaluate p.
Qualitative Approach The main approaches [16, 17]
proposed to answer the qualitative question are based
on Hypothesis Testing. In order to determine whether p ≥
ϑ, we follow a test-based approach, which does not
guarantee a correct result but controls the probability
of an error. We consider two hypothesis: H : p ≥ ϑ and
K : p < ϑ. The test is parameterized by two bounds, α
and β. The probability of accepting K (resp. H) when
H (resp. K) holds is bounded by α (resp. β). Such
algorithms sequentially execute simulations until either
H or K can be returned with a confidence α or β, which
is dynamically detected. Other sequential hypothesis
testing approaches exists, which are based on Bayesian
approach [18].
Quantitative Approach In [19, 20] Peyronnet et al.
propose an estimation procedure to compute the
probability p for M to satisfy ϕ. Given a precision
ε, Peyronnet’s procedure, which we call PESTIM,
computes an estimate p′ of p with confidence 1 − δ, for
which we have: P r(|p′ − p|≤ε) ≥ 1 − δ. This procedure
is based on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [21], which
provides the minimum number of simulations required
to ensure the desired confidence level.
The quantitative approach is used when there is no
known approximation of the probability to evaluate, i.e.
to obtain a first approximation. This method is useful
when the goal of the analysis is to have a idea on how
well the model behaves. On the contrary, the qualitative
approach determines whether the probability is above
a given threshold, with a high confidence and in a
minimal number of simulations.
5. Timed OCL Constraints for SoS Requirements
The challenge in promoting the use of formal specifi-
cation languages in an industrial setting is essentially
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to provide a good balance between expressiveness and
usability. The SoS setting introduces further challenges
for the need of specifying properties of the state of
complex systems and architectures.
Finally, for scalability reasons, monolithic verification
approaches should be avoided in favour of composi-
tional ones, such as those based on the theory of con-
tracts [22]. In this section we present the requirements
language, called GCSL (Goal and Contract Requirement
Language). The full GCSL language specification, as
well as the details of translation of the GCSL patterns
into BLTL, can be retrieved in [23]. In this section we
focus on providing a brief recap of the language and
illustrate why it is appropriate to define SoS and CSs
requirements. We also discuss an explicit contribution
of this paper to GCSL.
5.1. A Survey of GCSL
A GCSL contract is a pair of Assume/Guarantee
assertions denoting requirements on SoS and CSs
inputs and outputs, respectively. Contracts allow us to
decompose requirements and perform local or global
verification on need. Assertions are built upon GCSL
natural-language patterns, some of which are shown in
Figure 1. GCSL patterns are inspired by and extend the
Contract Specification Language (CSL) patterns [24],
developed in the SPEEDS European project. These
natural-language based requirements have their formal
semantics defined by translation into corresponding
BLTL formulas, enabling the application of SMC. To
simplify the specification of properties of complex
systems and architectures, GCSL integrates the Object
Constraint Language (OCL) [25], a formal language
used to describe static properties of UML models. OCL
is an important means to improve the expressiveness
and usability of GCSL patterns. Using OCL we can
describe properties about types of CS in the SoS
architecture, while being independent of their actual
number of instances and, thus, defining requirements
that are adaptable to the natural evolution of the SoS,
without the need of rewriting them.
OCL allows also to define algebraic constraints over
Constituent Systems attributes. In summary, GCSL
Patterns are able to express real-time constraints over
complex portions of the entire SoS state.
To show the expressiveness of GCSL, consider the
following simple example (based on Pattern 12 from
Fig. 1):
SoS.its(CriticalComponent)→ forAll(cc |
whenever
[ cc.its(TempSensor)→ exists(ts | ts.temp > cc.threshold) ]
occurs,
[ cc.connected(CoolingFan)→ exists(f | f.on) ]
occurs within [ 1 min,5 min ] )
This architecture-abstract requirement says that if
any CS of type CriticalComponent has one of its
TempSensor measuring at time t a temperature
that is higher than the threshold set by the specific
CriticalComponent (the threshold may be different
for distinct components) then one of the CoolingFan
connected to that component should be switched on
within the [t+1 min,t+5 min] time frame. This property
does not depend on a concrete architecture or on the
number of the mentioned CSs. It can be used as a
requirement for any SoS that integrates the mentioned
CSs types.
The idea of mixing OCL and temporal logic originates
from the need of specifying static and dynamic
properties of object-based systems. In [26, 27] OCL has
been extended with CTL and (finite) LTL, respectively,
without support for real-time properties. The work
in [28] is more similar to ours and it is based on
ClockedLTL, a real-time extension of LTL. ClockedLTL
is slightly more expressive than BLTL, because it
allows unbounded temporal operators, whereas BLTL
is decidable on a finite trace.
As mentioned previously, patterns are motivated by
infeasibility of direct use of BLTL, which is a very
low level language and commonly used properties may
require the nesting of several temporal operators, with
the risk of making requirements hard to understand
and error-prone. Patterns provide a convenient way
to represent frequently occuring and well-identified
schemes, while avoiding errors due to the complexity of
the underlying logic. One can expect to have a library
of patterns, which is what the methodology developed
during the DANSE project prescribed [23], in order
to capture the most relevant temporal constraints for
the considered domain. The methodology developed
during the DANSE project prescribes to have a library of
patterns [23] that captures the most relevant temporal
constraints for the considered domain. In the rest of
this section we are going to discuss a number of these
pre-defined patterns. Clearly, their choice is inevitably
subjective and depends on the field of application as
well as on the test case at hand. The expressiveness
of BLTL, jointly with OCL, makes the patterns library
easily extensible to cover future, domain-specific needs.
Figure 1 shows some of the behavioural patterns of
GCSL (all the patterns can be found in [23]). Patterns 2
and 3 are typical safety properties, where Ψ denotes
an argument where an OCL property can be used to
describe a state of the SoS. The translation of pattern 2
into BLTL states that the atomic property Ψ should
be true at every real-time instant within simulation
end time k. Pattern 3 is translated similarly. Pattern 8
shows the joint use of events counting (the n indicates
a number of occurrences triggering the pattern) within
a real-time interval, such as [3.2 seconds, 25.7 minutes].
Its translation relies on the BLTL operator occ and, even
8
EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
An Application of SMC to continuous validation of heterogeneous systems
if it does not involve any temporal operator, it cannot
be decided on a single state but it needs to be checked
across the entire trace. In this case we have no explicit
mentioning of the simulation time k but we have the
overall constraint on all patterns requiring a, b to have
appropriate values (a ≤ b ≤ k). Pattern 12 is used to
express a liveness property which is triggered by an
initial condition Ψ1 occurring at time t and discharged
by a following condition Ψ2 occurring within the
interval [t + a, t + b] that is relative w.r.t. the time t of
occurrence of Ψ1. Its translation into BLTL underlines
a number of important aspects of this pattern. First,
the pattern is verified on the entire simulation up to
time k − b. This is needed because if a condition Ψ1
occurs at k − b, we need to have enough remaining time
(actually b) to verify whether either it is discharged by
a condition Ψ2 (making the pattern true) or not. As a
consequence, a condition Ψ1 occurring after time k − b
would not require any following discharging condition.
Second, on the occurrence of a condition Ψ1 the pattern
requires a shift to time a (as close as possible, depending
on the actual states produced by simulation) which is
indicated by the next operator X≤a. From that point
onwards, we can check for the occurrence of the
condition Ψ2 in the remaining interval using F≤b−a.
5.2. Contribution to GCSL
Before illustrating the new patterns, we enrich the set
of atomic predicates of BLTL with adequate timing
operators.
On extending BLTL Usually atomic predicates
describe properties of system states, e.g. by comparing
a variable with a constant. We propose here an
extension where atomic predicates also depend on
the past (i.e. from states before the current one). In
particular, we are interested in measuring the amount
of time during which a given atomic predicate has been
true. The syntax for our predicates is as follows:
AP ::= true | false | AP ◦AP | Nexp ./Nexp
Nexp ::= #Time | Id | Constant | dur(AP ) | occ(AP , a, b)
| Nexp ±Nexp
Here, ◦ contains the usual boolean connectors , ± the
usual arithmetic operators and ./ the usual comparison
operators. Given a trace τ = (σ0, t0), · · · , (σk , tk) and a
step i, our predicates are interpreted as follows:
[[true]](τ, i) = true and [[false]](τ, i) = false;
[[#T ime]](τ, i) = ti is the simulation time at step i;
[[id]](τ, i) = σi(id) is the value of var id at step i;
Operators and comparisons have their usual semantics;
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = 0, if i = 1,
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = dur(p)(τ, i − 1), if i > 1 ∧ ¬[[p]](τ, i −
1),
[[dur(p)]](τ, i) = dur(p)(τ, i − 1) + ti − ti−1, otherwise.
[[occ(p, a, b)]](τ, i) =
∑
a≤tj≤b 1{true}([[p]](τ, j))
The dur function computes the amount of time
during which the predicate p has been true since the
beginning of the trace. The #T ime notation returns the
simulation time at the current point. The occ function
computes the number of steps in which a predicate
holds within the given time bound. For instance,
G≤t(dur(UP) > 0.9 · #T ime) is true iff for every step
between 0 and t, the amount of time during which UP
holds is at least 90% of the elapsed time.
On monitoring extended BLTL In order to support
the new #T ime and dur constructs, we extend the
atomic predicates available in BLTL. Concerning the
#T ime variable, we first recall that each state in a
trace contains a timestamp, according to Definition 1.
Indeed, this value is necessary for verifying patterns
involving time bounds. At a given state, each predicate
is evaluated by replacing #T ime by the timestamp
of that state. The predicate dur(φ) is evaluated by
accumulating the amount of time during which the
predicate φ evaluates to true, according to its semantics
defined above.
On GCSL extension We are now ready to present our
new contribution to GCSL, that is patterns 13 and 14.
Those patterns are suitable for expressing safety and
reliability constraints, such as the availability of a SoS.
As shown in Figure 1, the BLTL translation of these
patterns relies on the novel #T ime and dur. Pattern 13
checks that, at each simulation point during [a,b], the
amount of time during which Ψ has been seen to
be true so-far is at least e% of the currently elapsed
simulation time. We use the operator dur to accumulate
the overall time during which Ψ is true, and we
compare the accumulated value with the required
portion of the current simulation time, extracted with
the operator #Time, at each simulation point. Pattern 14
checks that, at time [b] the amount of time during
which Ψ has been seen to be true is at least the required
portion of b.
Figure 2 shows a (simplified) portion of the grammar
defining the OCL integration within the GCSL atomic
properties (indicated by OCL-prop). Properties are
constructed using usual boolean operators (◦) and
basic arithmetic comparisons (./) between expressions.
Attributes of Constituent Systems can occur in
properties or expressions and can be accessed by
using their Fully Qualified Name (FQN), such as
SoS.Sensor03.isOn.
OCL propositions can describe properties about
sets of Constituent Systems that are unknown at
requirements-definition time. These sets are left
undetermined because (1) the requirements may apply
to several variant architectures of the same SoS and
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ID Pattern (below, k is the simulation time and a < b ≤ k)
1 [ Ψ1 ] implies [ Ψ2 ] holds forever G≤−1(Ψ1 → G≤−1(Ψ2))
2 always [Ψ ] G≤−1(Ψ )
3 whenever [Ψ1] occurs [Ψ2] holds G≤−1(Ψ1 → Ψ2)
4 [ Ψ1 ] implies [ Ψ2 ] during following [a,b] X≤aG≤b−a(Ψ1 → Ψ2)
5 [ Ψ1 ] during [a,b] raises [ Ψ2 ] (X≤aG≤b−a(Ψ1))→ X≤b(Ψ2)
6 [ Ψ1 ] during [a,b] implies [ Ψ2 ] during [a,c ] then [ Ψ3 ] during [c,b] (X≤aG≤b−a(Ψ1))→ (X≤aG≤c−a(Ψ2) ∧ X≤cG≤b−c(Ψ3))
7 [ Ψ1 ] occurs int times during [a,b] raises [ Ψ2 ] occ(Ψ1, a, b) ≥ n→ X≤bF≤−1(Ψ2)
8 [ Ψ1 ] occurs at most n times during [a,b] occ(Ψ1, a, b) ≤ n
9 whenever [ Ψ1 ] occurs [ Ψ2 ] holds during following [a,b] G≤−1(Ψ1 → X≤aG≤b−a(Ψ2))
10 whenever [ Ψ1 ] occurs [ Ψ2 ] implies [ Ψ3 ] during following [a,b] G≤−1(Ψ → X≤aG≤b−a(Ψ1 → Ψ2))
11 whenever [ Ψ1 ] occurs [ Ψ2 ] does not occur during following [a,b] G≤−1(Ψ1 → X≤aG≤b−a(¬Ψ2))
12 whenever [ Ψ1 ] occurs [ Ψ2 ] occurs within [a,b] G≤−1(Ψ1 → X≤aF≤b−aΨ2)
13 always during [a,b], [Ψ ] has been true at least [e] % of time G≤b(#Time < a ∨ dur(Ψ ) ≥ ( e100 ∗ #Time))
14 at the end of [a,b] [Ψ ] has been true at least [e] % of time X≤aF≤b(dur(Ψ ) ≥ e100 ∗ (b − a))
14 at [b], [Ψ ] has been true at least [e] % of time F≤b(dur(Ψ ) ≥ e100 ∗ b)
Figure 1. GCSL Patterns and their BLTL translations, with Ψ ,Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ OCL-prop, a, b ∈ R, e ∈ OCL-expr
OCL-prop ::= true | false | FQN | not OCL-prop | OCL-prop ◦ OCL-prop | OCL-expr ./ OCL-expr |
OCL-coll → forAll( var | OCL-prop [var ] ) | OCL-coll → exists( var | OCL-prop [var ] ) |
OCL-coll → empty() | OCL-coll → notempty()
OCL-expr ::= FQN | OCL-coll → sum() | OCL-coll → size() | . . .
OCL-coll ::= attribute | csName | its(type) | connected(type) | OCL-coll . OCL-coll
Figure 2. Simplified OCL fragment for GCSL Atomic Properties, with ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔} and ./∈ {>,≥,=, <,≤}.
(2) the SoS architecture may evolve during the SoS
life-cycle. Indeed in [1] one of the five SoS-specific
properties of a complex system is that the number
and type of systems participating to a SoS may change
over time. Ideally, the specifications of the system
should remain independent of the number and type
of CSs, which is exactly what OCL provides as a
feature within GCSL. In order to support properties
that are parametrized by the SoS architecture, GCSL
provides the quantifiers forAll and exists that allow
us to instantiate properties over finite collections
(OCL-coll) of Constituent Systems (the var ranges
over these collections and occurs in the OCL-prop
which is the scope of the quantifier). A corner case of
quantification is provided by the set operators empty
and notempty that simply return a truth value after
testing the emptiness of the collection. Standard OCL
allows to concatenate object names (here indicated as
csName) by the “.”-containment relation, until reaching
an attribute. In GCSL we add (1) another (weak)
containment operator (its) that allows to navigate the
systems hierarchy in terms of CSs types and (2) an
operator (connected) that allows to navigate the
neighborhood of a CS, again in terms of types.
Quantifiers occur also in expressions (OCL-expr)
and allow to aggregate the values of (equally-typed)
attributes. E.g. the simple expression
(SoS.its(Sensor).temp→ sum( ))/(SoS.its(Sensor)→ size( ))
can be used to compute the average temperature in a
SoS where the number of CS of type Sensor is unknown
or time-dependent.
Since BLTL does not interpret the OCL syntax
(except for FQN), the translation from GCSL to BLTL
is done once the architecture is fully known and fixed.
OCL operators can be nested and their elimination
is performed by induction over the structure of the
formula in an outside-in fashion. Conceptually, this
can be done by repeated application of three steps:
(1) resolution of the outermost OCL collections (that is,
replacing a collection with a finite set of FQN), which
eliminates its and connected operators, (2) elimination
of the universal (existential) quantifiers, replaced by
the corresponding conjunctions (disjunctions) of the
instantiated scopes, (3) elimination of the remaining
operators by replacement with corresponding Boolean
or arithmetic expressions, and (4) recursion on
new outermost OCL collections. Termination of this
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procedure is trivially proved. In practice, this procedure
is reiterated each time the SMC analysis is called in
order to capture every architecture change.
In practice the tool-chain dynamically evaluates the
formula as the architecture changes. termination
is ensured by the fact that at each quantifier
elimination the number of quantifiers nesting
decreases ++++ Mention the potential combinatorial
blow-up of the formula and the need of an on-
the fly evaluation algorithm. For example, assume
that the requirement considered previously is
checked on the architecture in Figure 3. The collec-
tion SoS.its(CriticalComponent) would be resolved into
the set {SoS.cc01,SoS.cc02}. Then, the new outermost
collections would be SoS.cc01.its(TempSensor),
SoS.cc01.connected(CoolingFan),
SoS.cc02.its(TempSensor), and
SoS.cc02.connected(CoolingFan). That are
further resolved into: {SoS.cc01.ts01,
SoS.cc01.ts02}, {SoS.cc01.cf01}, {SoS.cc02.ts03},
and {SoS.cc02.cf01,SoS.cc02.cf02}, respectively. The
formula would be:
whenever
[ SoS.cc01.ts01.temp > SoS.cc01.threshold ∨
SoS.cc01.ts02.temp > SoS.cc01.threshold ]
occurs
[ SoS.cf01.on ]
occurs within [ 1 min,5 min ] ∧
whenever
[ SoS.cc02.ts03.temp > SoS.cc02.threshold ]
occurs
[ SoS.cf01.on ∨ SoS.cf02.on ]
occurs within [ 1 min,5 min ] ∧
This elimination-based approach is justified by the fact
that SoS development with architecture reconfiguration
has, typically, a larger time-scale than the operational
level of the CSs. So architecture snapshots can be
individually analysed, while architectures alternatives
are generated from generic architectural pattern.
After having illustrated the main features of GCSL
and how they support the SoS specification and
dynamic evolution challenges we discuss, in the
following section, how to obtain a unique behavioural
model of the SoS by integration of single and
heterogeneous CSs behavioural models.
6. Performing Statistical Model Checking
This Section describes the work-flow and the tool-
chain (see Figure 4) we have set-up to accomplish
statistical model checking analysis on Systems of
Systems models. The tool-chain has been adopted by
the industry partners of the DANSE Project: CARMEQ,
IBM, EADS, and Thalès. The core of our SMC tool-chain
is composed of three main tools: IBM Rhapsody is the
Figure 3. Architecture with connection (e.g. cc01 − cf01) and
containment (e.g. cc01 − ts01) relations.
tool implementing the UPDM language to model SoS
architectures, DESYRE is the tool providing the joint
simulation engine for SMC and PLASMA [5] is the tool
providing the SMC analysis engine. Other modelling
tools like Modelica and Simulink/Stateflow surround
this core tool-chain to provide behavioural models in
the form of FMUs.
6.1. SMC Analysis Workflow
Figure 4 shows our SMC analysis work-flow. The
work-flow starts with two parallel branches. The
topmost block of the left branch represents the parallel
development of Constituent Systems’ models, each with
its best-fitting modelling tool. The topmost block of
the right branch represents the development of the
SoS architecture in UPDM as described in Section
2.2. Once each CS model gets ready (e.g. for joint-
simulation and SMC analysis) it is exported from
its modelling tool into the FMI compliant format.
This step is represented by blocks named “FMUs”
in the left branch of Figure 4. On the right branch,
when the UPDM blocks in the SoS architecture are
DESYRE 
(Joint Sim) 
PLASMA 
(SMC) 
open_session 
new_simulation 
new_simulation 
close_session 
SMC Analysis 
Configuration 
SMC Analysis Results 
FMUs 
CS Models 
SoS Model Structure & 
Configuration 
Intermediate Format FMUs 
CS Models 
DESYRE Internal Representation 
Code 
Generation 
DANSE Exporter 
Rhapsody Plug-in 
DESYRE Import Services 
1 
2 B 
A 
Figure 4. SMC Analysis Workflow.
11
EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
A. Arnold, M. Baleani, A. Ferrari, M. Marazza, V. Senni, A. Legay, J. Quilbeuf and C. Etzien
1) in synch with their corresponding CSs models (e.g.
same interfaces) and 2) correctly interconnected, our
Rhapsody exporter plug-in can be invoked to translate
the UPDM model into a form that DESYRE can use
to un joint-simulation. The two branches merge into
the “DESYRE Internal Representation” being the set of
FMUs and intermediate format of the SoS architecture.
At this point of the work-flow all the information
needed to run the statistical model checking analysis is
available. To launch the SMC analysis the user has to
provide a proper SMC analysis configuration.
6.2. IBM Rhapsody
IBM Rational Rhapsody [29] is a model-based sys-
tem engineering environment implementing industry-
standard languages such as UML, SysML and UPDM.
Referring to Figure 4, IBM Rhapsody represents the
starting point of the SMC analysis work-flow. The
SoS architecture is specified within this tool by using
the UPDM industry-standard language, conveniently
extended to meet SMC analysis specification needs.
Figure 5 shows how the UPDM extensions described
in Section 2 have been implemented in IBM Rhapsody.
Figure 5. DANSE Profiles and Stereotypes implemented in IBM
Rhapsody.
During DANSE Project IBM has extended the Rhapsody
tool to generate FMI 1.0 compliant FMUs from most
of UPDM behavioural diagrams, thus making it join
the pool of those candidate modelling and simulation
tools able to export CS models for our SMC analysis
purposes.
Exporting information for SMC. IBM Rational Rhapsody
provides a Java API set for integration with external
tools. We developed a Java Exporter Plug-in to translate
information from the UPDM SoS architecture model,
along with all the information related to SMC analysis
i.e. GCSL requirements, FMU names and URIs, and
traceability settings to a format intelligible by DE-
SYRE, the joint simulation engine. Our Exporter Plug-in
integrates into Rhapsody as an UPDM extension profile
(«DANSEExporterPlugIn» profile in Figure 5). The effect
of loading our «DANSEExporterPlugIn» profile is that a
menu item named “Export Model 4 DANSE” is added
to the “Tools” menu of IBM Rhapsody. Once invoked
from the IBM Rhapsody “Tools” menu our Exporter
recursively parses both the UPDM Block Definition
Diagram and the Internal Block Diagram to translate all
the information needed to perform SMC analysis into
the DESYRE internal representation format (XMI).
6.3. SMC Analysis in PLASMA
PLASMA is a tool for performing SMC analysis.
Contrary to existing tools, PLASMA offers a modular
architecture which allows to plug new simulators and
new input languages on demand. This architecture has
been exploited to verify systems and requirements from
various languages/specific domains such as systems
biology [30], a train station [31], or an autonomous
robot [32].
The core of PLASMA is thus a set of SMC algorithms,
which includes those presented in Subsection 4.2 as
well as more complex ones [5]. This core is completed
by two types of plug-ins, that are controlled by the
SMC algorithm. First, the simulator plug-ins which
implements an interface between PLASMA and a
dedicated simulator to produce traces from a dedicated
input language on demand. Second, there is a checker
plug-ins that verify whether a finite trace satisfy a
property.
In this paper we extended the facilities of PLASMA as
follows. First, we built a new plug-in between PLASMA
and DESYRE in order to produce traces from FMI-FMU
model. Second, we used the BLTL checker plug-in that
we enrich with the two new primitives dur and #T ime
in order to monitor those traces and report the answer
to the SMC algorithm. As a last implementation effort,
we also implemented a compiler from GCSL to BLTL.
Interaction between PLASMA and DESYRE. Before
invoking PLASMA, one has to launch DESYRE and
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load a SoS model as well as the corresponding FMUs.
Then DESYRE GUI allows the designer to set and
run the SMC analysis. In particular, the designer
selects the type of SMC algorithm to use and the
corresponding parameters (number of traces for Monte
Carlo, precision and confidence for Chernov Bound . . . ).
The designer also selects the properties to be evaluated
among those embedded in the UPDM model.
Once the analysis is launched, DESYRE translates the
GCSL properties to BLTL, as described in Section 5.
It then invokes PLASMA and transmits the list of
properties to check, as well as the algorithm and
parameters to use. PLASMA then requests DESYRE to
start the first execution. The execution is controlled
step-by-step by PLASMA. At each step DESYRE
provides a new snapshot of the system state, by
giving the current value of every observed port in the
architecture. A detailed description of the interaciton
between PLASMA and DESYRE is provided in [3].
6.4. The SMC Workflow from the User Perspective
Figure 6 shows how the user exports the Rhapsody
UPDM SoS model in the intermediate format compliant
with the format expected by DESYRE. When our
Exporter plug-in terminates the translation of the
UPDM SoS architectural model it prompts a “Save”
window to store its output on the user’s file-system.
Figure 7 illustrates how the user imports the DESYRE
Internal Representation into DESYRE. The import is
accomplished in two steps: the Intermediate Format
of the SoS architecture exported from IBM Rhapsody
is imported and then all the FMUs needed for SMC
analysis are imported. To run a DANSE statistical
model checking analysis the user creates a statistical
model checking configuration in DESYRE. Figure 8
shows DESYRE’s SMC Analysis Configuration Editor.
From the editor the user selects one SMC Analysis
Method out of the ones provided by PLASMA. Figure
8 shows that the Montecarlo method has been selected.
According to the selected analysis method the editor
DANSE Exporter 
Rhapsody Plug-in 
Execution 
Figure 6. Export to DESYRE of IBM Rhapsody Model
Representing the SoS Architecture.
Figure 7. Import the Intermediate Representation into DESYRE.
prompts the associated Method configuration frame to
configure its parameters. Through the Simulation time
field the user specifies the desired lasting time of
each SMC simulation run. To make DESYRE select
the correct SoS system model made of the SoS
architecture, CS behavioural FMUs and initialization
Figure 8. DESYRE’s SMC Analysis Configuration Editor.
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Figure 9. Adding or Importing GCSL Contracts for SMC Analysis.
Figure 10. Interpreting SMC Analysis Results.
values for variables the user has to select or specify the
correct path in the System model field (top of Figure
8). GCSL contracts specified in the IBM Rhapsody
UPDM model are available in the DESYRE intermediate
representation and can be imported into the SMC
configuration editor by clicking the Import button
highlighted in the bottom right of Figure 9. In this
case the user might not be interested in validating all
the imported GCSL contracts through the SMC analysis
she/he is configuring. To address this need we decided
to make the imported GCSL contracts selectable by
means of check-boxes. Such check-boxes are visible in
the lower part of Figure 9. If needed, further GCSL
contracts can be added by clicking the Add button in
the Contracts form, as shown in the top-right corner
of Figure 9. This action invokes the GCSL Contract
editor window , where the user can specify the new
GCSL contract in its three components: Assumption,
Promise and Owner, the latter being the model element
to which the GCSL contract predicates on. When the
configuration is completed the user can launch the SMC
analysis campaign. The Play button to run the SMC
analysis is shown in the top-right corner of Figure 8.
After the SMC analysis has terminated the user selects
the SMC Analysis Results view, that appears as shown
in Figure 10. SMC analysis results are displayed per
GCSL requirement as shown in the bottom-right corner
of Figure 10.
7. A Case Study
This section illustrates the application of our technol-
ogy to a concept alignment example that was defined
for the DANSE Project. This case study has the partic-
ularity to embed all the difficulties of the case stud-
ies proposed by EADS, THALES, and CARMEQ that,
for confidentiality reasons, cannot be described in this
paper.
7.1. Modeling
We modeled an emergency response SoS for a city
fire scenario in UPDM. The city is partitioned into 10
districts, and we focus on a few fire-fighting constituent
systems (CS). We consider the following CSs: the Fire
Head Quarter (FireHQ), the Fire Stations, the Fire
Fighting Cars and the Fire Men. The behavior of the CSs
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Figure 11. CS behaviour modelled in other tools (e.g.
OpenModelica)
Figure 12. SoS architecture in Rhapsody
has been modeled in several FMI-compliant authoring
tools. For example, the FireMan has been modeled in
OpenModelica (as shown in Figure 11) which is an
open-source multi-domain modeling tool based on the
Modelica language. Other CSs have been modeled using
Rhapsody state-charts. The CSs rely on the new UPDM
profile to include probabilistic behavior. For instance,
each District models occurrences of fires by randomly
choosing the time before the next fire according to
a exponential distribution. The time before a fire is
reported to the head quarter is also randomly chosen.
We remind the reader that the objective of this work is
not to learn the probability distribution itself (this has
to be done via observations), but rather to show that it is
conceptually possible to incorporate such information
within the model.
The SoS integrated architecture was built by
instantiating the CSs and by specifying how to
connect them through an Internal Block Diagram,
shown in Figure 12. The SoS architecture is exported
to DESYRE using a DANSE-specific exporter plug-
in. Each CS behavioral model is exported from the
corresponding authoring tool into FMUs, according to
the FMI standard. This enables the DESYRE platform to
Figure 13. Simulation results in DESYRE
simulate the whole SoS model and to plot some selected
variables – see Figure 13 for an illustration.
The simulation is parameterized by its duration,
expressed in the time of the model. For our experi-
ments, we choose to simulate 10 000s of execution.
Since our model of computation is event based, the
computation time needed for running this simulation
depends on the number of events occurring during
the simulation. Whenever there are few events, such
as in the top of Figure 13, the simulation takes a few
seconds. In that case, there is no event between two
pikes, corresponding to two fires that are very quickly
extinguished. Simulations involving more events, such
as the one at the bottom of the Figure, require a few
dozen of seconds to complete. In that case, fires are not
extinguished and the time between two events is kept
small to describe the evolution of the fire.
7.2. Expressing Goals of the SoS
Our main objective is to check that the fire area
remains small enough. In order to define “small
enough” independently of the number of components,
we require that the fire is less than a given percentage
of the total area.
In our model, each district has two variables of
interest, its area and the fire area.
Our first formulation states that the fire area is always
less than X percent of the total area. The total fire area
is the sum of the fire area in each district, which can be
expressed in GCSL by SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea-
>sum(). We define Pattern 1 as follows:
always [SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea→ sum()
< (X/100)∗SoS.itsDistricts.area→ sum()]
As Pattern 1 might be too strong, we propose an
alternative formulation. More precisely, we allow the
fire area to exceed X% of the total area, but no more
than 10% of the time. For technical reasons, we define
Pattern 2 as the negation of the above property, namely:
at [ 10000 ], [SoS.itsDistricts.fireArea→ sum()
> (X/100)∗SoS.itsDistricts.area→ sum()]
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has been true at least [ 10 ] % of time
Pattern 2 is true whenever the fire area is above the
threshold for more than 10% of the time, that is when
the SoS behaves incorrectly. As we want the probability
that the system behaves correctly, we have to compute
the probability of the complementary event. This is
done by subtracting the probability that Pattern 2 holds
from 1.
7.3. Unwanted Emergent Behaviors Detection and
Evaluation
One of the challenges in SoS design is the detection
and analysis of unwanted emergent behaviour. In our
case, simulation allowed us to detect an (undesired)
emergent behaviour which is depicted in the lower part
of Figure 13. Our analysis of this emergent behaviour is
the evaluation of the probability of its occurrence. The
first step is to define a GSCL pattern that characterizes
the absence of the emergent behaviour. One key
characteristic of this behaviour is that fires spread over
entire districts. We assume that the emergent behaviour
does not occur if there is no area where the fire has
taken the whole district. This is specified in Pattern 3:
always [SoS.itsDistricts→ forAll(district |
district.fireArea < district.area ) ]
7.4. Analysis and Discussions
In this section, we use SMC to compute an estimate of
the probability for Pattern 1, 2 and 3 to hold. We use the
PESTIM method which is parameterized by an allowed
error ε, and a confidence 1 − δ. We chose an error of
0.1 and a confidence of 99% (δ = 0.01), which requires
265 simulations traces. These traces are obtained by
running stochastic simulations of the model. The length
of a simulation is set to 10000s. We present the analysis
results and time for Pattern 1 in Table 1. The analysis
result is an estimation of the probability that Pattern 1
holds, based on the 256 traces.
Table 1. Probability that fire is always smaller than X percent
of the total area during 10000 seconds.
X Probability Analysis Time
1 0.98490566 0:34:23
0.1 0.954716981 0:39:54
0.01 0.966037736 0:31:03
0.001 0.939622642 0:36:14
0.0001 0.603773585 0:28:49
0.00001 0.350943396 0:25:23
As expected, the probability that the fire remains
smaller than X% of the total area increases when X
increases. Indeed, “the fire area remains smaller than
X% of the total area” implies that “the fire area remains
smaller than Y% of the total area” for any Y ≥ X.
However, the probability returned is an approximation,
with an error up to 0.1 with a confidence of 99%.
Therefore, the fact that the probability decreases from
0.96 to 0.95 when X increases from 0.01 to 0.1 is
not significant. Indeed, the difference between the two
values is less than the error. On the contrary, the
difference between the probabilities obtained for X =
0.0001 andX = 0.001 are significant since they are more
than twice the error. In our model, the total area is about
23 square kilometers. Therefore the two last lines of the
table correspond to respectively an area of 23 and 2.3
square meters.
Table 2. Probability that fire area is smaller than X percent of
the total area at least 90% of the time.
X Probability Analysis Time
1 0.954716981 00:40:05
0.1 0.981132075 00:34:25
0.01 0.966037736 00:43:22
0.001 0.977358491 00:42:37
0.0001 0,973584906 00:42:59
0.00001 0,996226415 00:37:25
In order to obtain the probability presented in
Table 2, we subtract from 1 the probability that
Pattern 2 holds. We obtain the probability that the fire is
smaller than X percent of the total area for at least 90%
of the time (over 10000s). Again, since for each value of
X we ran a different set of simulations, it is not clear
that the probability that the pattern holds increases
whenX increases. With this more permissive definition,
we see that even small fires have a low probability
to stay on for more that 10% of the simulation time.
By comparing with Table 1, we can conclude that
frequently occurring fires (i.e. very small ones) are
quickly extinguished, because the probability of the last
two lines are significantly higher in Table 2.
Finally, we evaluate the probability to obtain the
unwanted emergent behavior depicted in Figure 13,
that is the probability that Pattern 3 holds. The returned
result is 0.9622, which means that the probability that
the contract holds is between 0.8622 and 1 with a
confidence of 99%.
We showed here how our tool chain is used to
evaluate whether a given pattern holds. By evaluating
the probability of Pattern 1, 2 and 3, we were able to
discover that small fire occur often (last two lines of
Table 1) but are not likely to last long (last two lines
of Table 2). Finally, the emergent behavior occurs with
a probability between 0 and 0.14, which explains why
Pattern 1 and Pattern 2 do not occur with a probability
of 1. This problem could be resolved by studying the
causes of the emergent behavior and evolving the SoS to
avoid it, for instance by adding more fire fighting cars.
At this level of analysis, a precision of 0.1 is sufficient
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to obtain a good general idea about the probability
that each of the patterns occur. In general, using
SMC requires to find the appropriate trade-off between
the required precision and the time available for the
analysis and subsequent re-engineering.
Our Patterns are independent on the actual number
of components. Indeed, adding constituent systems
such as districts or cars, even if they have a new
behavior, do not require specifying new patterns. The
analysis is still possible on the modified SoS model.
In the framework of the DANSE project, Industrial
Partners built models of their SoS under analysis. SMC
and other methods provided them a higher confidence
in their models [33]. More precisely, one Partner verified
Mean Time Between Failures (safety) requirements in
an Air Traffic Control case study. Another Partner
verified sufficient water availability (robustness to
failures) in a water distribution system of national
scale.
8. Conclusion, Future work and related work
This paper proposes a full tool-chain for the rigorous
design of Systems of Systems via formal reasoning and
Statistical Model Checking.
Recent work promotes simulation techniques as
the principal way to perform SoS analysis. In [34]
the authors use discrete event specification (DEVS)
concepts and tools to support virtual build and test of
systems of systems. Their MS4-Me environment enables
modeling and simulation (M&S) of SoS by allowing the
user to specify constituent systems’ behavior in terms
of a so-called Constrained Natural Language. The tool
is implemented in Eclipse and employs Xtext, Eclipse
Modeling Framework and the Graphical Modeling
Project.
Recent work in [35] provides an overview of the
underlying theory, methods, and solutions in M&S
of systems of systems, to better understand how
modeling and simulation can support the Systems of
Systems engineering process. However, simulation is
an incomplete analysis and it is not able to assess
the likelihood of the simulated behaviors. This is not
acceptable from the point of view of SoS analysis, as it
does not provide to the designer sufficient confidence
of correctness. Other approaches to verification of
complex systems are based on exhaustive formal
analysis, such as model checking, or simulation-
based formal analysis, such as run-time monitoring.
Industrial model checking techniques [36] are not
adequate to the complexity and dynamicity of SoS. Run-
time monitoring does not seem to be adequate to the
context of SoS, where failures detection should provide
a likelihood estimate of the failure and sufficient
time for devising failure-avoidance corrections. In this
perspective, a very promising approach to provide
sufficient coverage of the SoS behavior while keeping
the analysis cost low is based on Statistical Model
Checking (SMC) [4]. SMC is a simulation-based formal
analysis providing an estimate of the likelihood
of requirement satisfaction and a tunable level of
confidence in the accuracy of analysis results.
Some frameworks, such as BIP [37] or Reo [38] allow
the user to describe architecture of systems using alter-
native composition operators. Both these frameworks
theoretically permit composition of heterogeneous sys-
tem, by including existing code into the components.
However, they provide no standard such as FMI/FMU
allowing to compile a particular component indepen-
dently of the architecture, which make them unsuitable
for an industrial environment. They both include a
stochastic extension [39, 40], which is not part of the
core framework.
Contracts for reasoning about heterogeneous systems
are presented in [41]. However, these contracts are
considered at a very abstract level, and thus are not as
useful as FMI/FMU from an industrial point of view.
Future Work Our objective is to improve our solution
by exploiting rare-event techniques [42] that would
allow us to detect rare emergent behaviors with a
minimal amount of simulations. Our second future
work is to automatize the relationship between the
outcome of SMC and the reconfiguration process, in
order to automatically find an architecture satisfying
sufficiently the GCSL contracts.
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